Measuring Development in China

The following work examines possible methodologies for measuring China's development advances.

Development management often uses techniques based on measurement or estimation of performance and impacts. To what extent do such techniques answer the problems and requirements of development as public action involving a multiplicity of agencies but with government agencies maintaining an important role?

This essay sets out to relate development practice and theory. It is set in the context of the 1997 World Development Report, ‘The State in a Changing World’, which outlines what are the two main themes of this work; the improvement of state performance and the reduction in the role of the state. I intend to explain to what extent the techniques of performance management respond to the ideas of state-role reduction. The work begins with definitions of the terms performance and impact and then discusses what is understood by ‘development as public action involving a multiplicity of agencies but with government agencies maintaining an important role’. Following, there is a description of the techniques used by development managers in the measurement or estimation of performance and impact. The subsequent section details the problems and requirements of development as public action involving multiple agencies and assesses to what extent the outlined techniques answer them. It concludes that the techniques of performance management, if applied by the state and external agencies with accuracy and transparency, can answer the requirements of development as public action involving a multiplicity of agencies but with government agencies maintaining an important role.

Performance as understood by this work is “the degree to which a development intervention or a development partner operates according to specific criteria/standards/guidelines or achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans” (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2002: A9). Impact is characterized as “changes in the well-being of individuals that can be attributed to a particular project, program or policy” (World Bank, 2004: para. 1). Changes in well-being are not by implication positive and intended but can be negative and unintended. The phrase ‘public action involving multiple agencies but with government agencies maintaining an important role’ is taken to mean “the provision of a good or service [which] is transferred from public to private sector, while government retains ultimate responsibility”. (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988: 4). This state lead can be expressed in restructuring arrangements such as Public-Private Partnerships, contracting out and concessions and may involve NGOs, private social enterprises or even private foundations. The Public-Private arrangements regarding the London underground system are good example of this kind of partnership.

Before characterizing the techniques used by development managers to measure performance and impact, I intend to discuss what exactly these techniques seek to measure. The development management literature suggests that efficiency, effectiveness, economy and equity (The Four E’s) are the criteria performance measurement techniques should use to assess policies and projects. Efficiency is described as “the rate and cost at which inputs result in outputs” and effectiveness as “performance in relation to targets set in the original plan.” (Robinson and Thin, 1993: 6). Thomas adds that economy is “how cheaply inputs can be obtained to achieve a given output” and equity as “how evenly distributed [the] benefits [are] resulting from the outputs.” (Thomas, 2004:3).

The following discussion of the techniques used to measure the four E’s of performance and impact, while not exhaustive and exclusive to development management, is provided to illustrate the scope and complementarily of tools at the disposal of development managers. The techniques measure performance and impact before, during and after policy and project decisions are made. Estimation of performance allows the state to assess how the four E’s might be achieved and on-going and retrospective analysis shows how it can be improved. The discussion begins with techniques used to estimate performance and impact.

Multiple Criteria Analysis (MCA) is “an approach for choosing from among a set of alternatives when there are multiple objectives” (UNESCAP, 2003: para. 2). In effect, Multiple Criteria Analysis illustrates to what extent different policies or projects fulfill specified indicators. The result of such an analysis aids decision-makers in choosing the best alternative. MCA uses both quantitative and qualitative data so that the four E’s are represented in its outcomes. An application of MCA in the context of multiple agency development led by the state can be seen in the granting of water concessions to social enterprises. Initially the state sets the indicators of what it considers the nature of water provision services, such as the quality of drinking water, reliable supply and broad distribution then social enterprises bid for the concession and the state matches these bids against the indicators it has set down.

The UNDP describes Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA) as “a type of analysis that involves comparing the relative costs of operating a programme with the extent to which the program [meets] its aims.” (UNDP Evaluation Office, 2005: para. 18). Cost-effectiveness Analysis assists development managers to assess the economy, the value-for-money, of alternative policies or projects by comparing the costs of each one against a stated aim. For example, the state is looking into partnering a NGO to organize activities which raise reading abilities in primary schools and a number of methods are under discussion. “The costs associated with each alternative [project] can be calculated… [and] the effectiveness of each alternative may be measured through setting reading tests for groups of students subject to the different methods,” by comparing the cost against the effectiveness of each alternative the most economic and effective method can be gleaned. (Asian Development Bank, 1997: 24).

Cost-benefit Analysis (CBA) “is a practical way of assessing the desirability of projects, where it is important to take a long view (in the sense of looking at repercussions in the further as well as in the near future) and a wide view (in the sense of allowing for side effects of many kinds on many persons, industries, regions, etc.), i.e. it implies the enumeration and evaluation of all the relevant costs and benefits.” (Prest and Turvey, 1965, p. 683). In essence, CBA is the subtraction of costs from benefits. “A simple cost-benefit analysis of a road scheme would measure the cost of building the road, and subtract this from the economic benefit of improving transport links.” However, as “it would not measure the cost of environmental damage”, (Mind Tools: para 4), CBA along with CEA can be viewed solely as an economic analysis of intended policies or projects.

On-going and retrospective measurement of policy and project performance and is embedded within a system of management information and looks to improve the performance and impact of policy and projects. Heeks suggests a Monitoring and Control System which stresses that the results of on-going and retrospective measurement should feed into not only policy and project inputs but also their processes and targets. Heeks adds that ascribing a pivotal role to control actions entails performance improvement throughout the policy or project.

The Monitoring and Control System as presented by Heeks gives managers a context in which to apply on-going and retrospective performance measurement, i.e. the “assessment of performance against objectives” (Robinson and Thin 1993, p.5). Paton’s eight instruments of performance management adapted to the needs of the state assessing performance by external agencies “illustrate the elements out of which performance management frameworks [such as the Monitoring and Control System] are constructed” (Paton, 2003: 22). These instruments feed into a paradigm as proposed by Heeks at the target/objective, inputs and process or activities stage. Briefly outlined the instruments are:

1. Specifying government arrangements; this instrument structures the relationships between the state and social enterprises to guarantee the accountability of social enterprises to the state.
2. Requiring public reports; social enterprises are obliged to produce open reports on performance which forces transparency to the state and the public.
3. Financial leverage; “is used to induce social enterprises to undertake programmes, join collaborations or make decisions that will help achieve performance as the government construes it.”
4. Setting and inspecting standards; the state is responsible for checking external agency performance to examine if objectives are being met.
5. Giving rights to service users; the state ensures that beneficiaries have a voice in the provision of services and goods so providers are made accountable to consumers.
6. Promoting new and better methods; the state promotes ‘good practice’, such as the “support for education and training initiatives concerning governance and management” in the UK education and health services.
7. Adjusting sector boundaries; the state threatens to bring in the private sector if performance is below expectations in the state half of partnerships.
8. Intervention; in extreme cases if performance is well-below expectations the state “reserves power to impose changes.”

(Paton, 2003; 21-30)

This work now deals with how far the techniques of performance measurement can answer firstly, the requirements and secondly, the problems of development as public action involving a multiplicity of agencies but with government agencies maintaining an important role.

The World Development Report of 1997 stressed the need for the state to improve its performance. Tools such as the economic analyses of CBA and CEA as well as the instruments suggested by Paton not only increase state efficiency through dealing with multiple agencies but also two of the other E’s-economy and effectiveness. The introduction of private sector practice into partnerships looks to evaluate them with an eye to “getting exactly what you want at the lowest possible overall cost.” (DFID, 2000: 3). However, the state needs to exercise caution over equity performance due to distributional problems. The provision of services and goods to remote and by implication more expensive-to-reach areas should not be compromised, “value for money is not the only factor to justify an intervention”. (Asian Development Bank, 1997, 24).

A competitive environment is a requirement of multiple agency involvement in state-private sector partnership development. Tools which are used to estimate the performance and impact of policies or projects aid the state in its choice of partner agency. The lack of this requirement can result in decisions which have been made because no other suitable alternative exists. In cases such as this the state should maintain its monopoly. Transparency in policy and project decision making remains important in the state. The awarding of concessions or contracts through merit rather than personal relationships is important to improving the four E’s, the tools which measure performance in advance, if accuracy is maintained, help this process.

The techniques of performance measurement guarantee that the state retains political control, as final decisions using them are made by the state themselves. Although participation of social enterprises and the public is possible in order to receive an overview of a development environment, the state is the key decision maker. Lastly, and this can be taken as a starting point too, the techniques help governments think about going into partnerships, they do not compel the state into partnership and act as tools of information.

The problems associated with multiple agency roles in state-private sector partnership development illustrate how the techniques cannot answer all the questions it raises. La Fond discusses the contradiction between performance measurement and sustainability. She asks if performance measurement is a technique in which policies and projects are sustained rather than their objectives. La Fond suggests that the sustainability of local capacity and self-reliance provide a more accurate picture of development performance. (La Fond, 1995: 23-37). A tool such as Multiple Criteria Analysis lends itself to this kind of adaptation wherein the nature of the sustainability of a project can form a performance indicator.

There is an attribution problem linked to the management information system as proposed by Heeks. While the paradigm is successful in using performance measurement to address problems with process it cannot attribute the causes of change. The question to be asked is whether the outputs a policy or project involving multiple agencies achieves would have happened anyway, outside factors may have had an influential part in the change. “A major difficulty in attempting to measure benefits is to determine the extent to which it is possible to attribute improvements to the project as opposed to factors external to the project such as economic growth, increasing demand for labour, investment in public services… and infrastructure, all of which have a positive impact on well-being”. (Robinson and Thin, 1993). The paradigm has been extended to include impact assessment and external factors, (Thomas, 2004: 5) but the measurement of these criteria remain uncertain. An example of this attribution problem can be found in the operations of the British Council in Venezuela. A clear performance management system was in place and regular reviews ensured high performance levels from the English teachers. The teaching centre experienced high enrollment in 2003 during what were politically uncertain times in Venezuela. The problem for management was where to attribute this success; to improved teacher performance or the need for Venezuelan professionals to secure English language accreditation so that they could leave the country.

Paton suggests that problems associated with state-private sector partnership development can be found within the instruments proposed to deal with performance management at this level. Paton warns against selective inspections by the state of external agencies and to be wary of the “self-congratulatory reports they produce to cover inefficient performance. The implication is that deception in both halves of the partnership can have an effect on how well policies and projects perform. The domestic political and economic need for success can have detrimental impacts on transparency. Paton adds that public deference to the state and social enterprises may not subject them to the scrutiny which exposes such ‘fudges’. In fact the desire to provide evidence that multiple agency state led development is being carried out to donors in order to secure loans leads to the formulation of policies with performance difficulties. (Paton, 2003:22-28).

In conclusion, the techniques which have been outlined in this essay are merely an aid to decision making regarding policies and projects and their performance or estimated performance. They suit many of the requirements of ‘development as public action involving a multiplicity of agencies but with government agencies maintaining an important role’, in that they answer the needs of a competitive market and the improvement of state performance through its detailed measurement. The problems which partnership present are not all answerable by the techniques, this is because they are not immune to domestic and external politics as well as economic pressures. Therefore the techniques while they provide a forum for state and external agency partnership must operate in an environment of transparency on the part of the state and external agencies if an increase in the performance criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, economy and equity are to be achieved.

References:

Asian Development Bank (1997) ‘Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of Projects’, [Online] Available at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Guidelines/Eco_Analysis/least-cost.asp (accessed 7 January 2005).

Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C. (1988) ‘Privatisation in Less Developed Countries: An Overview’ in Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C., (eds) Privatisation in Less Developed Countries, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, pp. 3-48.

DFID (2000) ‘Procurement and Training Manual’, London, DFID Procurement Department.

DTLR (2001) ‘Multi-criteria Analysis: a manual’ London, Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions.

Heeks, R. (1998) ‘Public Sector Management Information Systems’, IDPM Working Paper Series, Paper No. 5, Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management.

International Fund for Agricultural Development (2002) ‘Managing for Impact in Rural Development: A Guide for Project M&E’, Rome, IFAD.

LaFond, A. (1995) ‘Sustaining Primary Health Care’ London, Earthscan.

Mind Tools (2004-last update) ‘Cost/Benefit Analysis-Evaluating Quantitatively Whether to Follow a Course of Action’ [Online] Available at: http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTED_08.htm (accessed 6 January 2005).

Paton, R. (2003) Managing and Measuring Social Enterprises, London, Sage.

Prest, A.R., and Turvey, R. (1965) ‘Cost-benefit Analysis: a survey’, Economic Journal, vol. 75, pp. 683-735.

Robinson, M. and Thin, N. (1993) ‘Project Evaluation: A Guide for NGOs’, Glasgow, Overseas Development Administration Joint Funding Scheme, NGO Unit.

Simister, N. (2000) ‘Laying the Foundations: the role of data collection in the monitoring systems of development NGOs’, Bath, Centre for Development Studies.

Thomas, A. (2004) ‘Lecture notes, Development Management: Issues and Trends, 2A Performance and its Management’.

World Bank (1997) ‘Overview’, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, Washington DC, World Bank, pp.1-11.

World Bank (2004) ‘Impact Evaluation, Overview: What is impact evaluation?’, [Online] Available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTISPMA/0,,menuPK:384339~pagePK:162100~piPK:159310~theSitePK:384329,00.html (accessed 3 January 2005).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Evaluation Office (7 January 2005-last update) ‘Glossary’ [Online] Available at: http://www.undp.org/eo/ADR/glossary.htm (accessed 7 January 2005).

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2003) ‘Methods of assessing the effectiveness of policies/measures’, [Online] Available at: http://www.unescap.org/drpad/vc/orientation/M5_10.htm (accessed 5 January 2005).

Development and Bureaucracy

China's realization to social justice faces a great challenge from its state bureaucracy. The following work looks at the relationship between development and bureaucracy.

This essay initially sets out to determine what is meant by the terms “development management” and “bureaucracy”. Following on from this discussion, I intend to reflect on the benefits and criticisms of bureaucracy in the development environment using perspectives from development literature and my own experiences. The next section deals with the irrelevance of some Weberian bureaucratic principles to the development field and the final part of this work evaluates the extent to which all of these issues concern development managers and presents some suggested solutions.

The definition of development management employed for this essay is the “management of intervention aimed at external social goals in a context of value based conflict” (Thomas, 1996: 106). The interventions are conducted by organizations such as state administrations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and organizations from the private sector. The incorporation of external goals and value based conflicts into this definition are of particular importance to the discussion of how far development managers should oppose bureaucracy and are discussed later in this work.

In the essay “African Perspectives on Governance”, Dele Olowu describes the characteristics of the ideal Weberian bureaucracy as including “a system of rational rules, specialization, precision, hierarchy, written records, routinization, separation between public and private realms, specified delimitation of authority, a career system, meritocracy, and strict discipline and control of officials” (Olowu, 2000: 156). To these features I would add that a bureaucracy relies upon an environment of predictability. This is to say that its routines are repetitive even in changing circumstances.

Many of the characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy can serve development managers and their administrations. Elements such as a precision, fairness, independence and meritocracy are ideals which any manager should strive for in their organizations. It is the abuse of such features which development managers should oppose and these are discussed below.

Robert Chambers in “The Self-deceiving State” asserts that bureaucracy does not function as it should. As a means of administration it is well suited to its job. However, through “false positive feedback…misperceptions and misinformation”, bureaucracy can impede development efforts, in effect there is a lack of precision. Chambers gives an example from Tamil Nadu to illustrate the realities of bureaucratic administration. He relates that in one village a “survey [of HYV adoption] showed less than 50 per cent…but the reports of the hapless Village Level Worker had risen to 95 per cent, leaving him with nowhere to go, and a problem with how to conceal the truth from visiting senior officers” (Chambers, 1992: 31-42). In my own experience working in the private sector at a language consultancy in Santiago, there was a deliberate policy on the part of employees and management to massage figures of successful course completion by existing clients with which to impress new ones.

Gleaning further examples from development literature, additional criticism of bureaucratic abuse is apparent. From the work of Dele Olowu we see that in some of the post-colonial states in Africa there is an autocratic nature to the prevalent state bureaucratic ethos. In his work “Bureaucracy and Democratic Reform”, Olowu argues that bureaucracies in some countries (such as the one in that existed in Uganda under Prime Minister Milton Obote) were subjected to control by the executive. The bureaucracies did not display the characteristics of fairness and in particular, independence. This culture of autocracy and control of the functions of bureaucracy by the executive is a direct inheritance from colonial powers. Europeans ruled through their bureaucracies and never developed centres of power because its officials were appointed from metropolitan centres. The ideal of meritocracy was dismissed (Olowu, 2000: 153-179)

So far we have dealt with three examples of bureaucracies that have not fulfilled Weberian ideals. These examples have illustrated the abuse of precision, fairness, independence and meritocracy. These very characteristics are essential to a development organization and the abuse of them is what must be opposed by development managers. The issue to be addressed now is the irrelevance of some Weberian bureaucratic characteristics to development.

Development management is concerned with external goals. These external goals contrast with the internally agreed goals of bureaucracy. This is to say that development managers are to not only focus on targets set by their organization but also a much broader canvas. Success depends on the organization’s ability to achieve wide-ranging social change. This is an uncertain environment with outcomes less predictable and its very unpredictability is at odds with bureaucratic thinking.

Chambers adds that there is a “Fordist” approach to this bureaucratic thinking, a one size fits all approach to projects. Chambers cites an example from Northwest India where “you could…plant any wheat you liked as long as it was the new HYV Sonora [strain]” (Chambers, 1992: 33). This method has it obvious effects on the effectiveness of projects. Circumstances are more likely to be diverse enough to warrant innovations. This stifling of innovation is further illustrated from my own experience working for the British Council in Venezuela albeit from a purely internal perspective. Although the British Council were not involved in a development intervention we can draw lessons from the bureaucratic culture. The organization’s performance management system was more a set of management determined tasks which needed completion by the end of the year rather than a mechanism in which employees could carry out innovative work. This dulling of originality needs to be resisted by development managers.

Development managers must resist the temptation to work with blueprints. Robin Murray elaborates and states that administrations should look out for “signposts and lists of possibilities, things to look out for, rather than universals.” In effect the organization becomes one which is learning and organic as opposed to mechanistic. (Murray, 1992: 78)

The final divergence between development management and bureaucracy is the assertion that development managers work “in a context of value based conflict”. This is in disagreement with the bureaucratic ideals of authority. Bureaucracy theory states that, “under an authority system, those in the subordinate role see the issuing of directives by those in the superordinate role as legitimate” (Unit Notes 1B: 3). If development managers are to work in an environment of “value-based conflict” they need to discard this element which proscribes divergent opinion.

In conclusion bureaucracy is a necessity for administering organizations. Development managers would do well to follow the ideals of Weber’s model which are relevant to the field; such as precision, fairness, independence and meritocracy. On the other hand, the abuse of these features needs to be opposed by development managers. Checks and balances through a genuine system of 360° feedback is a culture which needs to be encouraged among development managers to counter-balance these abuses. In addition, development management is unlike other forms of management. The environment of external goals, uncertainty and value based conflicts within which development managers focus their activities leads us to conclude that they should oppose those elements of a Weberian model of bureaucracy which contradict with the principles of development management.

References:

Chambers, R. (1992), “The self-deceiving state”,IDS Bulletin, vol.23, no.4, pp.32-42.

Murray, R. (1992), “Towards a flexible state”, IDS Bulletin, vol.23, no.4, pp.78-88.

Olowu, D. (2000), “Bureaucracy and Democratic Reform”, in Hyden, G., Olowu, D. and

Okoth Ogendo, H.W.A. (eds) African Perspectives on Governance, Africa World Press, Asmara, pp. 153-179.

Thomas, A. (1996), “What is Development Management?”, Journal of International Development, vol.8, no.1, pp.95-110.

Unit Notes 1A “Characteristics of development management”, adapted from Open

University course Capacities for Managing Development, Part 1, pp.7-10, 37-48.

Unit Notes 1B “Bureaucracy and development management”.

Privatization and Development

Continuing the theme of state involvement in development, here is a work I produced on the role of privatization. Considering the Chinese government's heavy involvement in development, it explores the consequences of state failure to produce results.

“Is privatization an appropriate response to the criticisms of the role of the state in development?”

This essay begins with a discussion of what is meant by the terms “privatization” and “the state”. The following section outlines the criticisms of the role of the state in development by its most open critics, neo-liberals. The final section describes the extent to which privatization is an appropriate response to these criticisms and concludes that a case-by-case basis needs to be applied if a state is to undergo a programme of privatization as no successful blueprint is in existence and that the role of the state in development is of importance.

“The term ‘privatisation’ is used to describe a range of different policy initiatives designed to alter the balance between the public and private sectors.” (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988: 3). Privatization can take three forms; the change in ownership of public assets (part or whole) to the private sector, deregulating markets monopolized by the state to allow the private sector into that market and lastly while the state keeps ultimate control of a service, the supply of it is reallocated to the private sector. (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988: 3-4). The state, the implementers of privatization policies, in a development context can be described as having “at least a limited capacity to create order, formulate and implement policy, and manage public boards and corporations.” (Sandbrook, 1988: 172-3). While most developing countries fall into this category, at the extremes two other kinds of state exist; weak states whose sovereignty is recognized internationally but which operate as “clients” of foreign powers, for example the Central African Republic’s relationship with France and strong states, such as Malawi, which have the capability of “maintaining social order and devising and implementing diverse policies”. (Sandbrook, 1988: 172-3). This essay now analyses how the main proponents of privatization, neo-liberals, criticise the role in development of the state.

The neo-liberal, ‘private interest’ view of the state, which attempts to bring the ideas of the market into the state, to satisfy the needs of individuals, asserts that the state:

• cannot address market failure
• maintains oversized, inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies
• wastes resources (rent seeks)
• restricts freedom by imposing its view of what is best for society and is therefore invasive and authoritarian
• encourages dependency and not self reliance

(Mackintosh, 1992: 61-73).

Briefly summarised, the state attempt to influence development on behalf of its citizens has failed and the satisfaction of individual interests is the key to development. Although privatization is the neo-liberal solution to this failure, the World Bank 1997 World Development Report ‘The State in a Changing World’ proposed a role for the state in development albeit limited. The role was defined as the reduction of the state to the areas of the economy where it has the capability to operate and to improve the performance of that role. Privatization is therefore a response to the provision of services and goods where states have not done so well for the reasons given above. This has not always been a successful response to encourage development as the next section details.

The extent to which privatization is an appropriate response to the criticisms of the role of the state is explored with examples from development literature at three levels; the macroeconomic, the microeconomic and the social.

Appropriacy of privatization at the macroeconomic level:

Privatization at this level has offered governments in developing states the ability to offset a proportion of its fiscal debt through the sale of assets and the taxation of newly created businesses, “privatizing can bring an end to what has often been a net fiscal drain for the government of many decades’ duration and certainly governments will gain in that way.” (Birdsall, 1994: 177). Eliminating the inefficiencies and corruption in most state owned enterprises in developing countries, (see Martin, 1993: 40) is more likely to occur “from an increase in market competition”. (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988, 22). In other words opening the market will lead to greater transparency and efficiency in the name of profit maximization. Conversely, this open market to buyers is viewed as a contemporary manifestation of colonization. If “ownership passes into foreign hands the effect will tend to widen international inequalities in the distribution of wealth”. (Commander and Killick, 1988: 100). An example of this “re-colonization” and inequality in wealth distribution can be seen in the telecom sector in Peru and Chile which is dominated by Telefonica, a company from former colonial power Spain. In addition, the move toward privatization while offsetting some of the excesses of bureaucracy creates an environment which “reinforce[es] the positions of privileged political and business elites, and [is] an overwhelming rout for any notion that privatization is in part about the promotion of competition.” (Heald, 1988: 77). Finally, at this level the notion that World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans remain dependent on a state promoting a blueprinted course of privatization when conditions for that privatization, such as mature institutions, are not in place, is a dangerous one vulnerable to exploitation.

Appropriacy of privatization at the microeconomic level:

Privatization has brought increased productivity and accountability. The previously state owned Kelang Container Terminal in Malaysia experienced an increase of 13% in its annual growth rate post-privatization. The accountability of management in providing this growth “appears to have been critical.” (Jones, 1994: 79, 87). However, “in the name of profit maximization, private firms are selective about their operations. They will be selective about the type of investment that they undertake and about the customers that they serve.” (Bayliss, 2002: 11). In this scenario state inefficiency seems inevitable as the state is left with the most unprofitable parts of the economy which are in need of the most subsidies. If looked at closely the growth rates of the Kelang Container Terminal prior to privatization was 5% per annum, certainly a more attractive business acquisition than a loss making state owned enterprise.

Appropriacy of privatization at the social level:

The pursuit of self-reliance through privatization in the private interest view of the state has had a number of negative impacts at this level. Quoting Ferreira, Barnes states that in privatization “income inequality may rise in the short and long term, with low income groups unable to take advantage of the redistribution of assets following privatisation.” (Barnes, 1999: 22). Income loss coupled with the loss of jobs as privatized companies seek to cut costs questions the affordability to the consumer of vital privatized services in the post-privatization environment. Protests against the rises in the price of water in Bolivia in 1999 post-privatization, displayed how decreased incomes clashed with price rises. (Bayliss, 2002: 13). At this level the profit driven motives of privatization have failed development interests.

In conclusion, the neo-liberal solution of privatization has had mixed results in response to neo-liberal criticisms of the state. Where states are too weak to withstand the negative economic impacts of privatization on social conditions, the contribution of this policy to development is questionable. For developing states able to enforce regulatory bodies and control the domination of vital goods and services from foreign companies and powerful elites there is more incentive to privatize as evidence shows. However, as the market will not regulate itself weak states unable to regulate their economies remain vulnerable and continued control of state industries in a performance enhanced environment is desirable. In both cases the role of the state in development remains important.

References:

Barnes, C. T. (1999) ‘The Macroeconomic and Social Impacts of Privatisation and linkages at the microeconomic level’, Chapter 5 in The Macroeconomic and Social Impacts of Privatisation with Special Reference to Portugal, unpublished PhD thesis, Victoria University of Manchester.

Bayliss, K. (2002) ‘Privatisation and Poverty: The Distributional Impact of Utility Privatisation’, Working Paper No. 16, Centre on Regulation and Competition, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester.

Birdsall, N. (1994) ‘The Jigsaw Puzzle’, in Galal, A., Shirley, M. (eds) Does Privatization Deliver? Highlights from a World Bank Conference, Washington D.C., The World Bank, pp. 107-120.

Commander, S., Killick, T. (1988) ‘Privatisation in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Issues’, in Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C., (eds) Privatisation in Less Developed Countries, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, pp. 91-124.

Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C. (1988) ‘Privatisation in Less Developed Countries: An Overview’ in Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C., (eds) Privatisation in Less Developed Countries, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, pp. 3-48.

Heald, D. (1988) ‘The Relevance of UK Privatisation for LDCs’ in Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C., (eds) Privatisation in Less Developed Countries, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, pp.68-90.

Jones, L. (1994) ‘Malaysia’ in Galal, A., Shirley, M. (eds) Does Privatization Deliver? Highlights from a World Bank Conference, Washington D.C., The World Bank, pp. 75-90.

Mackintosh, M. (1992) ‘Questioning the State’, in Wuyts, M., Mackintosh, M., Hewitt, T. (eds) Development Policy and Public Action, Oxford, Oxford University Press/ Open University, pp.61-89.

Martin, B. (1993) ‘In the Public Interest? Privatisation and Public Sector Reform’, London, Zed Books.

Sandbrook, R. (1988) ‘Patrimonialism and The failing of Parastatals: Africa in Comparative Perspective’, in Cook, P., Kirkpatrick, C., (eds) Privatisation in Less Developed Countries, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, pp. 162-179.

World Bank (1997) ‘Overview’, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, Washington DC, World Bank, pp.1-11.

Rights for Marginalised People

Below is a brief summary of my study into contemporary Uyghur economic, social and cultural rights.

As the study details, I have been a long time observer of the human rights situation among Uyghurs. The work was undertaken to address the scant information on the effects of the Great Western Development Drive on the Uyghur population in China.

Furthermore, there is a real opportunity to turn the Great Western Development Drive into a concerted effort to address the inequalities in economic and social development that exist between Han and Uyghur. I would be interested to see Uyghur groups consider strengthening their work on economic, social and cultural rights by advocating for a rights-based approach to development. Of course, this would not be to the detriment of important work on political rights.

Dissertation available upon request.

Politics and Development

How important is politics to the study and the promotion of international development?

"Politics is money and money is politics" is certainly applicable in the aid decisions made by donors.

Democratized, decentralized states may not necessarily perform any better than centralized, authoritarian states and it is possible to pick examples to evidence either as having the "right" formula. Perhaps we should be looking beyond developmental states, to developmental regions within states. If you take the People's Republic of China as an example, the pattern of development has been grossly unequal. Coastal regions are experiencing rapid rates of growth in comparison to areas in the Chinese hinterland, which in fact are experiencing negative growth. Good governance or effective governance therefore becomes a matter at every level of the state administration.