Politics, Globalization, and China

The objective of this work is to outline how the political dimension of globalization has impacted on one of the globe’s emerging political powers, the People’s Republic of China. Initially, this essay sets out to consider the conflicting views behind the term “globalization” and then to distinguish the characteristics of the political dimension of globalization. The following section then uses these characteristics to critically examine political globalization in the People’s Republic of China. Finally, a conclusion is reached as to why the People’s Republic of China has accepted or rejected the various characteristics of political globalization.

“Globalization is not yet a fully formed concept. It is at best a convenient point of reference for airing out a range of ideas about the emerging state of the world.” (Saha, 2004: 1). Jan Aart Scholte sees this range of ideas behind the perception of the global interconnectedness of information, trade, people, culture and ideas as falling into three categories: conservative, liberal and critical. Conservatives view globalization as a process which “is not thought to involve any noteworthy transformation of the world system.” (Scholte, 1996: 49-50). At the heart of globalization in a conservative analysis is the traditional competition between nation states whereas a liberal critique of globalization “regards the process uncritically as progressive and benign.” (Scholte, 1996: 50). Therefore liberals view globalization as having the potential to enhance human development and increase global opportunity and equity. Lastly, critical perspectives assert that “the rise of supraterritoriality could well involve an extension or reinvigoration…of imperialism, xenophobia, patriarchy, racism, militarism, authoritarianism, fundamentalism, nihilism and other recurrent predicaments of modernity.” (Scholte, 1996: 52). Scholte concludes that a critical view would approach globalization with “vigilance”.

Although globalization is a concept viewed from different perspectives, three dimensions to the process can be identified. These are the cultural, economic and political. These dimensions do not act independently of each other and the influences they exert on each other are expressed in this essay. However, this work focuses on the political dimension.

The political dimension of globalization is outlined by Malcolm Waters as having five characteristics. These are stated as: political culture, sovereignty, international organizations, international relations, and the focus of problem-solving activities. In this outline Waters asserts that there is a difference between the ideals and the present realities in each of these five characteristics in the contemporary global political environment. In analysing the effects of the political dimension of globalization on the People’s Republic of China I intend to use these five characteristics as presented by Waters and critically examine them in two ways. The first of these is to compare the ideals of each characteristic with the present reality in the People’s Republic of China and the second is to assess why the present realities have developed as they have.

In the outline, the ideal pattern of globalization ascribed to the characteristic of political culture is the “common and planetary transcendence of state-centric value-commitments” (Waters, 1995: 123). Interpreted as the development of political systems which emphasise a global ideology over one which is suited to individual states, the People’s Republic of China shows resistance to such a change in its political system. Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China’s political system has followed a socialist path and the maintenance of socialism is of concern to the present leadership. In a speech delivered by the Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Zha Peixin, at the Chinese Economic Association Annual Conference in 2003, he states that in the face of globalization the People’s Republic of China intends to “further improve [its] socialist democracy” (Zha, 2003: para. 7). The leadership’s insistence on preserving the political system is based on not only safeguarding the existing power elites but also on its assertion that politically, only the Chinese Communist Party can manage the benefits from the economic dimension of globalization without ceding control over internal affairs. However, there are tensions in this assertion which are shown in the characteristics of sovereignty and international organizations.

Waters presents the ideal development of sovereignty in his outline as the “absence of sovereign states and [the establishment of] multiple centres of power at global and local and intermediate levels” (Waters, 1995: 123). Traditionally, the government of the Chinese Communist Party has always advocated strong opposition to the weakening of the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. The indignities suffered during the part-colonisation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are firmly rooted in the Chinese consciousness. A border conflict with India in 1962 is testament to the seriousness of the People’s Republic of China’s longstanding territorial sensitivity. However, in other spheres the People’s Republic of China has seen an erosion of its sovereignty through the processes of globalization. Since joining the world economy the People’s Republic of China’s control over its economic management, which it used to firmly have in a centralized economy, is subject to external factors. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 showed that “the economic dislocation and political upheaval in developing Thailand and Indonesia, not to mention industrialized South Korea, presented a sobering vision of the challenges to national sovereignty and well-being that can accompany greater integration into world markets.” (Yong and Moore, 2004: 3). This situation arose as the government’s initial perception of globalization was purely economic and the threats to its sovereignty were not anticipated as the state sought to continue its economic growth. (Yong and Moore, 2004: 4-5). The ability of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain the assertion that only they could manage globalization without ceding sovereignty is under pressure from external forces.

The second ideal pattern of sovereignty in the outline, the establishment of multiple centers of power, I intend to discuss in the later section on international relations.

A second source of internal tension and also an opportunity to alleviate it, for the Chinese Communist Party is found in the People’s Republic of China’s increasing engagement with international organizations. In the outline of the political dimension of globalization, the ideal pattern of globalization for international organizations is that they become “powerful [and] predominant over national organizations” (Waters, 1995: 123). The People’s Republic of China involvement in international organizations has presented it with international commitments and obligations. The internal policy adjustments made by the government of the Chinese Communist Party to allow for the People’s Republic of China’s entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001 illustrates how a degree of policy control has been conceded and how predominance over national organizations is achieved by international ones. Although engagement with international organizations has presented a source of internal political tension, externally “the mutual dependence between the sovereign states [allows] the government…much more right to speak in some international affairs.” (Du : para. 5). In effect powerful international organizations in “the globalized world also offers China opportunities to express its discontent” (Yong and Moore, 2004: 7). The People’s Republic of China as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has often asserted the strengthening of the United Nations in conflict resolution as shown in its stance on the Iraq crisis in 2003; in effect the People’s Republic of China through international organizations seeks to exert its influence on the course of global events.

The international relations of the People’s Republic of China in the context of political globalization have also presented it with advantages. The ideal pattern of globalization for this characteristic is “fluid and multi-centric” relations between states. (Waters, 1995: 123). The opportunities that international relations present the People’s Republic of China are illustrated by the fact that “mainstream Chinese strategic thinkers now believe that globalization, as manifested in transnational forces, international institutions, and a greater need for multilateralism, can be used to “democratize” the U.S. hegemonic order to minimize unilateralist power politics.” (Yong and Moore, 2004: 3). This has been translated into policy as “Beijing has in the new millennium propounded a new official formulation—‘multi-polarization and economic globalization’…as the strategic context for Chinese foreign relations.” (Yong and Moore, 2004: 6). While the People’s Republic of China has cultivated a move to multi-polar centers of power through its international relations it has also used their global fluidity to focus on internal security issues. The establishment of the Shanghai Security Council in 1996-7, comprising of the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan was an example of how the People’s Republic of China has strengthened its hand against Islamic unrest in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. This policy was widened in scope when the People’s Republic of China linked the activities of armed Uygur separatists to the United States of America’s war on terror.

The final characteristic to be analysed in this essay is the focus of problem solving activities. The ideal pattern for this characteristic is defined as “local issues in the context of the global community” (Waters, 1995: 123). The People’s Republic of China’s stance on this characteristic is summarised by Du Chuangguo, who states that “we should fight against the hegemonies, which invade other country’s sovereignty as an excuse of globalization, even interfering in other country’s internal affairs.” (Du : para. 7). The People’s Republic of China is unequivocal about this issue. An example is to be found with Taiwan and the involvement of the United States of America in its protection of the island considered a rogue province by the People’s Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China insists that this is an internal matter and it is a condition of all diplomatic relations with the country. The sensitivity of this issue relates back to the discussion of China’s exploitation by European nations but as the People’s Republic of China increases its involvement in the political processes of globalization it will have to use its growing power to protect itself from external “interference” in internal issues such as rural poverty, and Taiwan.

In conclusion, the People’s Republic of China is attempting to maintain a balance between preserving the integrity of the state and the control of the Chinese Communist Party against a background of globalizing its economy. The People’s Republic of China’s growing influence and power on the world stage affords it a luxury which many nations of the developing world do not have-the ability to pick and choose which characteristics of political globalization best suit its own development. This policy of selecting the “best bits” of the political processes of globalization is calculated to not only protect Chinese sovereignty but also to offer its citizens the opportunities contained within economic and cultural globalization and increase the global influence of the People’s Republic of China.

References:

Du, Chuangguo “The Government Capacity of P.R.C in Globalization Process” [Online] Available at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ASPA/ UNPAN004213 .html (accessed 8 November 2004).

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Yu Keping (2004) “From the Discourse of “Sino-West” to Globalization-Chinese Perspectives on Globalization”, Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition Working Paper Series, Hamilton, Ontario.

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Does China still prioritze economic, social, and cultural rights?

This report attempts to relate the degree to which the People’s Republic of China has implemented a rights-based approach to development within its own borders. The People’s Republic of China is one of a group of Asian states which has emphasised the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights for its citizens over civil and political rights. As economic, social and cultural rights provide the framework from which the success of a rights-based approach to development can be measured; the People’s Republic of China, therefore, provides a salient example of how this approach has succeeded in a developing country. While the People’s Republic of China has been involved in development assistance outside of its borders, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, this report will concentrate on how a rights-based approach has impacted Chinese citizens. This is because domestically, the People’s Republic of China has purposely prioritized a policy of developing the material welfare of its citizens, while internationally its development programme is based on political solidarity. This report begins with a definition of a rights-based approach to development and then discusses The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which outlines the rights which comprise a rights-based approach to development. The report then continues with evidence which shows how the People’s Republic of China has successfully and unsuccessfully implemented a rights-based approach to development. In the conclusion, the extent to which China has followed a rights-based approach to development is assessed.

A rights-based approach to development “stresses liberty, equality and empowerment.” (Häusermann, 1998: 31). In A Human Rights Approach to Development, Häusermann outlines the approach, it:

• “Puts people first and promotes human centred-development
• Recognises the inherent dignity of every human being without distinction
• Recognises and promotes equality between women and men
• Promotes equal opportunities and choices for all so that everyone can develop their own unique potential and have a chance to contribute to development and social progress
• Promotes national and international systems based on economic equity, equity in the access to public resources, and social justice.
• Promotes mutual respect between peoples as a basis for peace, justice, conflict resolution, and sustainable human development.”

(Häusermann, 1998: 32).

Häusermann stresses that a rights-based approach “will utilise human rights principles and legal norms as a coherent framework for concrete action to eliminate poverty and to achieve sustainable improvement in the quality of life of the poor and socially isolated.” Therefore, a rights-based approach to development is embedded in the international legal system of human rights, draws its elements from it and holds states accountable to the realisation of those rights. (UN and OHCHR: para.2). As the international legal system of human rights is central to “a revitalisation of economic, social and cultural rights”, (Häusermann, 1998: 32), contained in a rights-based approach to development, this essay turns to the international instrument which closely relates to the rights-based approach. This is The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

The ICESCR, which was ratified by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its Twentieth Session on February 28, 2001, (Human Rights Watch, 2002: para. 1) defined the rights which encompass a rights-based approach to development. The first three parts (Articles 1-15) of the covenant provide a framework for the measures required to assess the successful implementation of a rights-based approach to development as defined by Häusermann. They are briefly summarized below:

Part 1 includes the right of peoples to self-determination and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources

Part 2 has at its core articles on non-discrimination and gender equality

Part 3 contains articles which seek to protect the right; to work (Article 6), to just conditions of work (Article 7), to form and join a trade unions and to strike (Article 8), to social security (Article 9), to assistance for the family (Article 10), to an adequate standard of living including food, housing and clothing (Article 11), to physical and mental health (Article 12), to education (Article 13) and to take part in cultural life (Article 15).

(OHCHR)

This report now turns to how the People’s Republic of China’s has matched the progressive realization of economic, social and rights as set out in the ICESCR and relates this discussion to how far this has meant the People’s Republic of China has implemented a rights-based approach to development.

“[T]here has been a worldwide trend to extend the notion of human rights to include so-called welfare rights, as is evident in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, this trend is particularly promoted by socialist and developing countries and has become the primary theme in China’s conception of rights.” (Ng, 1995: 59). This conception of human rights illustrates the People’s of Republic of China’s stance on providing an adequate standard of living to its citizens. The People’s Republic of China argues that economic, social and cultural rights should be prioritized and that “civil rights can only be considered after welfare rights have been taken care of.” (Ng, 1995: 68). The argument continues that state provision of economic, social and cultural rights requires governmental stability and a postponing ‘of [certain] rights until certain economic conditions have been achieved.” (Ng, 1995: 70).

Evidence is available which suggests that the People’s Republic of China has positively responded to its obligations under the ICESCR and is therefore progressively implementing a rights-based approach to development. More specifically, indicators show that the citizens of the People’s Republic of China have experienced progress in the right to education, health and adequate standards of living as outlined in the ICESCR (See Appendix 1). Between the years of 1990 and 2001, illiteracy decreased by 2.6% from 4.7% of the population to 2.1%, including a 0.03% decrease in the literacy gap between males and females. More impressive was the increase of 12.2% of children completing the fifth grade of school in the same time period. Health indicators showed that infant mortality per 1000 live births decreased by 7% from 1990 to 2001 and under-five mortality per 1000 live births decreased by 10% from 1990 to 2002. In fact an increase of 20% was recorded in the 1990s of births attended by skilled health personnel from 50% to 70%. The People’s Republic of China also improved the food security situation within its borders in the 1990s and the indicators demonstrate a 7% reduction in undernourishment among the population. The right to an adequate standard of living was further progressively realized by a 23% gain of access to sanitation in the 1990s to 40% of the total population (Social Watch, 2005).

As further evidence in its rights-based approach to development, the People’s Republic of China is keen to emphasise its role in the passing of the Declaration on the Right to Development. It stresses that “[s]ince 1981 China has participated in every session of the governmental experts group organized by the UN Commission on Human Rights to draft the Declaration on the Right to Development and made positive suggestions until the Declaration on the Right to Development was passed by the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in 1986.” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1991: para. 5). This willingness to promote the Declaration on the Right to Development displays the People’s Republic of China’s commitment to third generation or ‘collective rights’ above individual rights and reinforces its belief that “the most urgent human rights are still the right to subsistence and the right to economic, social and cultural development…[and that a] a favourable international environment must be created for the realization of the right to development.” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 1991: para.8). However, the issue of collective rights such as “the right of peoples to self-determination, rights of minorities…and environment rights”, (Loh, 1995: 152), has led to some of the strongest criticisms of the People’s Republic of China’s human rights record and its consequent effect on how far it has implemented a rights-based approach to development.

There is evidence which details the People’s Republic of China’s setbacks in implementing a rights-based approach to development (see Appendix 1). Health indicators show significant decreases in the number of children immunized against life threatening diseases and education indicators show a drop in the net primary school enrolment ratio. Reports from the People’s Republic of China concerning the work place detail “abysmal working conditions, combined with long hours, inadequate pay and even physical beatings,” (Chomsky, 1998: 46), as the People’s Republic of China moves from its ‘iron rice bowl’ economy to more market-orientated policies. Indeed this shift away from state intervention in the economic lives of Chinese citizens has seen public expenditure drop; with less money for education and health and a declining social security system. (Kent, 1993: 162 and Appendix 1). According to the Human Development Index the People’s Republic of China has slipped from 66 in the index in 1987 to 99 in 2000. (Kent, 1993: 165 and UNDP, 2000).

The People’s Republic of China’s support for collective rights through the Declaration on the Right to Development has also been challenged by human rights groups. They contend that the right to self determination as outlined in the declaration has been violated by the People’s Republic of China with their continuing occupation of Tibet and Xinjiang (East Turkestan). A statement prepared by the International League for Human Rights submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in February 2003 detailed a number of abuses by the People’s Republic of China against collective rights; “[v]irtually all of the natural resources and material wealth extracted from Tibet are channeled back to enrich China's eastern regions”. The report concludes that “[t]he Chinese government has adopted policies openly acknowledging its intent to use massive economic development in Tibet in part to eliminate a separate Tibetan culture—a purpose diametrically at odds with the Tibetan people's right of self-determination”. (Economic and Social Council, 2003: paras. 7 and 11).

Does all the evidence detailing statistical progress and setbacks and the People’s Republic of China’s ratification of international human rights instruments prove that the People’s Republic of China has moved to an implementation of a rights-based approach to development? What Häusermann has called a move “from human wrongs to human rights, from handouts to empowerment, from charity to rights.” (Hausermann, 1998: 32). The response to such a question is that some but little progress has been made. While the Communist Party of China has remarkably kept many of its vast population fed, housed and employed since the liberation in 1949, it is at a stage when “its decisions are self-preserving: it may ignore any demand which leaves its orbit…Individuals receive requisites disguised as rights, for they are treated as dependents and not as citizens.” (Lefort, 1995: 29). The separation and emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights and the repression of civil and political rights “is not a means of economic development. Respect for [all] human rights is not an obstacle to economic growth and is, indeed, a precondition for sustaining it.” (Loh, 1995: 164). This argument contends that the Chinese Communist Party needs to incorporate all forms of human rights in its development approach and until a firmer international legal framework exists, which holds states fully accountable to their human rights obligations, the rate at which the Communist Party of China implements a rights-based approach to development will remain deliberately self-serving.

References:

Chomsky, N., (1998) ‘The United States and the Challenge of Relativity’, in Evans, T., (ed) Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal, Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp. 24-56.

Economic and Social Council (2003) ‘The Right to Development: Written statement submitted by International League for Human Rights, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status’, [Online] Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/Symbol/E.CN.4.2003.NGO.163.En?Opendocument (accessed 24 February 2005).

Hausermann, J., (1998) ‘A Human Rights Approach to Development’, London, Rights and Humanity.

Human Rights Watch (2002) ‘Paying the Price: Worker Unrest in Northeast China’, [Online] Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/chinalbr02/chinalbr0802-08.htm#P891_192016 (accessed 23 February 2005).

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (1991) ‘Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities’ in Human Rights in China, [Online] Available at: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/ (accessed 24 February 2005).

Kent, A. (1993) ‘Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights’, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press.

Lefort, C., (1995) ‘Human Rights Today’, in Davis, M.C., (ed) Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, pp. 27-34.

Loh, C. (1995) ‘The Vienna Process and the Importance of Universal Standards in Asia’, in Davis, M.C., (ed) Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, pp. 145-167.

Ng, M., (1995) ‘Are Rights Culture-Bound?’, in Davis, M.C., (ed) Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, pp. 59-71.

OHCHR (Office of the United Nations high Commissioner for Human Rights) ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, [Online] Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (accessed 23 February 2005).

Social Watch (last updated February 2005) ‘Country by Country – China: Progress and Setbacks by Key Indicators’, [Online] Available at: http://www.socwatch.org/en/fichasPais/40.html (accessed 23 February 2005).

UN (United Nations) and OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) ‘Rights-based Approaches’, [Online] Available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches.html (accessed 23 February 2005).

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2000) ‘Human Development Index’, [Online] Available at: http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/english/presskit/hdi.pdf (accessed 24 February 2005).

First Development, Then Democracy: the case of China

This essay attempts to assess the complex relationship between development and democracy. It will explore the idea that a state must reach a certain level of development before the introduction of democracy is deemed conducive as well as the idea that development can only be achieved in an authoritarian system. The work conducts this analysis by taking into account the often contradictory academic debates on the issue. The essay begins by discussing the disparity of views among academics in comprehending the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘development’ and then establishes definitions of these terms as understood by this analysis. Subsequently theories proposing the ‘first development, then democracy’ argument are put forward using The People’s Republic of China as a frame of reference. The work then explores contrary proposals with evidence from Asia, Central America and Africa. The material presented is from the development literature and represents the broad spectrum of viewpoints the debate engenders. The essay concludes that the one-size-fits-all approaches to the development-democracy issue have disregarded the individual economic and political conditions which exist in every nation in the world.

Defining ‘development’ and ‘democracy’ is not a straightforward task. Conventionally development is viewed as an economic concept while democracy is viewed as a political one. However, these terms are interpreted differently according to numerous perspectives, which creates various definitions and as a consequence an absence of consensus among theorists and practitioners. These differences are briefly explored in the following section and arising from the discussion is a resolution on the definitions of development and democracy as understood by this essay.

“Depending on the individual, ideology, paradigm, culture, or context, democracy may mean many different things.” (Diamond et al, 1990: 6). Despite the wide-ranging approach-dependent meanings offered for the term democracy, this work offers a political definition of democracy which in itself can be viewed from a reductionist or expansive point of view. From a reductionist standpoint democracy is “a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested elections”. (Przeworski et al, 2000: 15). This position primarily considers democracy as a type of government, and a secondarily as a process in which those governed periodically participate in competitive elections to select an administration for the state. This electoral process then bestows a form of legitimacy for the elected officials chosen.

In an expansive definition, democracy can also be viewed as “a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a ‘highly inclusive’ level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties-freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations-sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation”. (Diamond et al, 1990: 6-7). This definition while incorporating the features of the reductionist view identifies democracy in the light of participation, political rights and as a type of society rather than government. It is the latter of these two definitions which is offered for this essay.

The concept of development as much as the concept of democracy “can be conceived only within an ideological framework”. (Roberts, 1984: 7). In addition, the division between reductionist and expansive definitions of development is another shared feature. “In the current orthodoxy…‘development’ is…narrowly defined; it is usually equated with economic growth and material well-being.” (Robinson and White, 1998: 3). This is “the dominant understanding, favoured by the majority of governments and multilateral agencies, [and] has seen development as synonymous with economic growth within the context of a free market international economy.” (Thomas, 2001: 562). From this point of view, successful development has a strong relationship with free markets and consequently capitalism, (Robinson and White, 1998: 3), rather than a strong relationship with democracy.

A broader and alternative conception of development is “centred…on entitlement and distribution…and by…an environment conducive to human well-being broadly conceived in spiritual and community terms.” (Thomas, 2001: 562). In common with the expansive definition of democracy, the expansive definition of development incorporates features of the reductionist view. What is elaborated is the idea that development should attend to needs beyond the material contained in economic rights to those needs embodied within cultural, social and political rights. Consequently, “democracy is at the heart of the alternative conception of development.” (Thomas, 2001: 570). This broader definition of development is favoured in this work.

In the following section, this essay considers the premise that development should precede the establishment of a stable democracy. This is analysed with evidence from the People’s Republic of China to illustrate two early theories of development; Classical Modernisation Theory and New Classical Modernisation Theory.

Classical Modernisation Theory, which gained popularity among economists in the 1950s and 1960s, argued “that economic development is a necessary…condition for political democracy”. (Lee, 2001: para. 9). It asserted that “the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ forms of social organization, already completed in the industrialized West”, (Leys, 1996: 9), could achieved in developing countries through assistance in building capitalist institutions by the ‘developed’ world. Classical Modernisation Theory therefore viewed a stable democracy as one of the representations of modernity and economic development was the route to it. (Leftwich, 1993: para. 35).

The government of the Chinese Communist Party in The People’s Republic of China during the post-Mao Zedong era self-consciously promoted the benefits of economic development to its citizens under the direction of Deng Xiaoping. “[T]he Four Modernizations of industry, agriculture, the military, and science and technology have highest priority in state agendas…economic growth is doubtless [the] state’s most important goal.” (Zheng, 1994: 237). Support for this modernisation drive through development of free markets was strong among the citizens of The People’s Republic of China. The pursuit of economic growth by building private wealth would bring The People’s Republic of China out of the chaos and poverty created by socialist-inspired modernisation pushes such as the Great Leap Forward. (Zheng, 1994: 244). To assist in realising The Four Modernisations, from the 1980s onwards large numbers of foreign experts, predominately from Western countries, were invited to The People’s Republic of China to advise the state on economic, scientific and technological matters. The success of this economic reform path is unchallenged; between 1993 and 2004 The People’s Republic of China’s economy grew on average by 9.9%. (BBC, 2005: para. 9). The economic achievements of The People’s Republic of China has also encouraged “the belief that economic growth, development, and greater integration with the outside world will lead to a more liberal and democratic China”. (Gallagher, 2002: 340-341).

Additional evidence presented by an analysis of The People’s Republic of China displays how that country is claimed to confirm the ideas of New Classical Modernization Theory, linked to the work of the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington. The theory argues that states must choose between building a successful economy and having a democracy. Events such as the Cuban revolution and the defeat of the United States of America’s political objectives in Vietnam caused social scientists in the United States to review their “concern with the processes of ‘modernization’ (the processes of transformation into advanced, capitalist and hence pluralist and democratic societies) to a concern with the maintenance of social control.” (Leys, 1996: 65). New Classical Modernization Theory claimed that authoritarian governments in developing nations should be supported by governments in the West in order to create the stable political environment required for economic development. These Western governments would still maintain a democratic reform agenda for developing nations once a benchmark of economic development had been achieved. This thinking differed from the ideas of Classical Modernization Theory which did not oppose the building of democratic institutions during the development stage. Classical Modernization Theory just maintained that those institutions would only mature once economic development was realised. The support offered to General Pinochet in Chile by the United States is evidence of the application of New Classical Modernization Theory in 1970s foreign policy.

The concept of order and stability apparent in New Classical Modernization Theory is synonymous with the Chinese concept of ‘luan’. “To the Chinese luan (chaos) is a very important thing to avoid. Luan is a Chinese word for…lack of order and predictability. The Chinese would prefer a dictatorship to luan after hundreds of years of turmoil.” (Noll, 2006: para. 3). The cultural embeddedness of this concept has given the Chinese Communist Party continued support for the authoritarian nature of its rule. This is reinforced by frequent pronouncements by the government, as evidenced in a white paper titled the ‘Building of Political Democracy in China’, on the importance of political stability, i.e. Chinese Communist Party rule, for the future development of The People’s Republic of China. (Scheaf, 2005: para. 2).

Having presented The People’s Republic of China as an example for both of these development theories, can it be said that the economic growth that The People’s Republic of China has experienced is resulting in a society which can be considered democratic or on the way to achieving democracy?

According to some commentators the beginnings of an incremental process of political democratization is underway in The People’s Republic of China due to the opening of the economy to market forces. In order to maintain its legitimacy the government of the Chinese Communist Party has been under pressure to release control over local centres of power. The government of The People’s Republic of China “must attempt to establish legitimacy and order, on the one hand, and has to promote socioeconomic changes from above on the other.” (Zheng, 1994: 246). The recent elections to select village leaders in rural China, evidence the view that “[a]s occurred in other developing countries, changes brought about by economic development…significantly influenced the attitudes of elements of the political elites toward political reform”. (Shi, 2000: 246-247). As Classical Modernization Theory asserts, this incremental nature of the democratization process, under high degrees of authoritarianism, maintains stability in the societal transformation to democracy and it would also “permit the development of broader social foundations for democratization, including a growing middle class and the institutions to mediate societal conflict.” (Gallagher, 2002: 371).

The growth economy of The People’s Republic of China is also cited as a firm example of development without democratization as New Classical Modernization Theory claims. However, the success of The People’s Republic of China’s economy translates into success for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Further economic development in The People’s Republic of China will lead to continued authoritarianism and not to democracy as it becomes a model of achievement. “Asia’s democracies, such as…the Philippines, lagged more authoritarian countries in economic progress-evidence, if you like, that democracy did…get in the way of development…Asia’s amazing growth record over three decades demonstrated that you didn’t need democracy”. (Chua, 2000: para. 6). This analysis traces no route between development and democracy, indeed, democracy in the West has brought high levels of social problems while authoritarianism has brought previously inexperienced personal and state economic prosperity in countries such as The People’s Republic of China and Singapore. (Gershman, 1997: para. 9). “In short, and uncomfortably, democratic politics is seldom the politics of radical economic change.” (Leftwich, 1993: paras. 49-50).

In the next part of this essay two theses are presented whose focus is on democratic conditionality for the process of development to be successful. This is done to create a contrast with the theories put forward to support the ‘first development, then democracy’ argument. These theses are; the neo-liberal approach and the model offered by the United Nations Development Programme in the 2002 Human Development Report. Each thesis is analyzed in turn by initially outlining its central features and then critically appraising it.

The neo-liberal approach to the development-democracy debate opposed modernization theory in many of its core principles, and especially with the ideas of New Classical Modernization Theory. In contrast to the assertions of Samuel Huntington, neo-liberals viewed authoritarian governments as impediments to successful development. In the 1980s Neo-liberals argued that democratic reform was a pre-requisite for development, thus turning on its head the paradigm set out in New Classical Modernization Theory. Reform not only contained a political direction but also an economic one. Neo-liberalism considered poor economic performance in developing nations as a direct result of over-staffed bureaucracies rife with corruption and elitism. By reducing the role of the state in economic planning through the implementation of political and civil service reform, coupled with an economy based on the free market, the needs of development would be served. The neo-liberal agenda was enacted through Structural Adjustment Programmes promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Loans from the two Bretton Woods Institutions were conditional on developing nations introducing the neo-liberal policies of state reform. For example, civil service reform in conformity with World Bank and IMF recommendations in Sri Lanka was linked to loan approval from 1989-1993. (World Bank, 2001: para. 5).

The evidence is not convincing to suggest that neo-liberal inspired Structural Adjustment Programmes were successful in promoting democracy before development. Much of the development literature details the failure of both neo-liberal objectives; the establishment of democracies and the achievement of development in developing countries. Adrian Leftwich observed in 1993 that “[t]hose currently pushing for democracy…appear oblivious to how few…conditions for democratic endurance exist in the Third World and elsewhere”. (Leftwich, 1993: para. 56). Leftwich added that primarily the politics as well as the institutional capacity of developing nations were not conducive to democracy. This led to situations where “[a] proliferation of political parties emerged with the opening up of democratic possibilities—30 in Angola, 71 in Congo, 26 in Cote d’Ivoire and over 200 in Zaire. This will hardly help stable democratic policies or coherent development strategies.” (Leftwich, 1993: para.57). Leftwich added that “[l]iberal democratic institutions…have seldom preceded economic development based on industrialisation and urbanisation.” (Leftwich 1993: para. 36).

Contrary to the neo-liberal paradigm, the regimes which did emerge from Structural Adjustment Programmes have been characterised as either ‘low-intensity democracies’ or authoritarian. Briefly, low-intensity democracies using Barry Gills’ description are “those governments that are formally democratic, but neither liberal nor pluralistic” (Ross, 2000: para. 8). Low-intensity democracies maintain the appearance of democratic institutions and procedures but are ambiguous regarding political and social reform. Many of the Central American regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as those found in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras embody the qualities of low intensity democracy. (Gills and Rocamora, 1992: 505). Commentators also claim that Structural Adjustment Programmes created regimes which neither maintained surface democratic procedures nor produced any significant growth. In sub-Saharan Africa the conditionality imposed by the World Bank and IMF loans generated authoritarian tendencies in some governments. “In Zambia the regime, faced with cross-pressure from domestic opposition and international financial and aid agencies, was constrained to adopt repressive measures...In Senegal, the authoritarian features of one-party dominance were reasserted in the face of political tension precipitated by adjustment reforms and in Nigeria the wide spread opposition to adjustment was met with repression and the co- option of opposition forces into the ruling block.” (Ibhawoh, 1999: 160). Recent initiatives by the World Bank and bi-lateral agencies have been unpersuasive in shedding the accusations of conditionality. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process of the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Account of the Bush Administration, both contain strands of the neo-liberal agenda. In the two programmes there still remains conditional attachment of political and economic reform to aid assistance.

The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report of 2002 ‘Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World’ examines the debate differently from the previously discussed paradigms. The report, influenced by the 2000 study headed by Adam Przeworski entitled ‘Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990’, offers an alternative approach which is evident in two ways; the report firstly, does not view development or democracy as having to occur before the other and secondly, defines development from another perspective. The report asserts that “[d]emocratic participation is a dimension of human development”. (Houtzager, 2002: para. 3). This position is most closely associated with the expansive definition of development presented earlier in this essay. Development is a concept which not only puts democracy at its centre but also attends to growth outside of the confines of economic success. Increasing democratic empowerment provides people with the means to define development for themselves and to push for economic and political policies which aim to realize those aspirations. The UNDP’s report therefore considers the debate concerning the order in which development and democracy should occur in developing nations as moot. Democracy and development can be encouraged as parallel stages even though there is little evidence throughout history of this ever having occurred, “[d]uring the Third Wave of democratization, the number of countries promoting democracy and free markets in parallel has grown substantially…This trend of building free markets while deepening democracy contrasts sharply with the slow and sequential pattern of capitalist democratic development in Western Europe and North America.” (Shin, 2005: 3).

Leftwich’s comment from 1993, in his analysis of the neo-liberal paradigm, best summarizes the criticisms of the UNDP report; “from a developmental point of view, the general but simplistic appeal for better ‘governance’ as a condition of development is virtuous but naïve. For an independent and competent administration is not simply a product of ‘institution-building’ or improved training but of politics. And if the politics do not give rise to the kind of state which can generate, sustain and protect an effective and independent capacity for governance, then there will be no positive developmental consequences.” (Leftwich, 1993: para. 63). Viewed from Leftwich’s perspective building democracy and development in tandem is unlikely to result in positive outcomes. Democracy cannot be expected to flourish under any circumstances if the politics of a nation will not allow it. The experiences of developing countries show that in regard to building successful development or democracy there is not one theory that provides all the answers. Leftwich’s suggestion is to consider the development-democracy debate as a matter of classification. For the purposes of this discussion, Leftwich proposes two types of state ‘developmental democratic states’ such as Botswana and ‘non-developmental democratic states’ such as Jamaica. (Leftwich, 1998: 52-53). By matching developing countries to these two types of state, a conclusion on the development-democracy problem emerges. Leftwich deduces that there are few developmental democratic states which can be so classified, consequently contradicting the parallel model as presented in the UNDP report.

To conclude, democracy and development are contentious concepts and mean different things to different people. For example the government of The People’s Republic of China claims that through stable one-party rule it encourages development and protects the economic rights of its citizens. This view sharply contrasts with the UNDP which considers democracy as an essential component of development. The very pursuit of democracy as a desirable goal is also questioned by some developing countries as it is seen as a way for Western nations, through conditionality, to introduce capitalism in order to develop new markets. On the other hand, the Millennium Development Goals contain no mention of building democratic institutions. This essay has presented theories from multiple perspectives which critically appraise the statement that development should precede democracy. These perspectives can be evidenced from the experiences of developing countries throughout history therefore offering each theory a degree of credibility. The lessons of history serve to organize this wide variety of theories and ideologies. Observation of the experiences of ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries demonstrates that there is no one route to either democracy or development. The specific economic and political conditions that exist in any one nation should determine how it achieves its democratic and developmental goals.

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